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Abstract
This paper estimates the price for restructuring risk in the US corporate bond market during 1999–2005.
Comparing quotes from default swap (CDS) contracts with a restructuring event and without, we find that
the average premium for restructuring risk represents 6%–8% of the swap rate without restructuring. We
show that the restructuring premium depends on firm-specific balance-sheet and macroeconomic variables.
And, when default swap rates without a restructuring event increase, the increase in restructuring premia is
higher for low-credit-quality firms than for high-credit-quality firms. We propose a reduced-form arbitrage-
free model for pricing default swaps that explicitly incorporates the distinction between restructuring and
default events. A case study illustrating the model’s implementation is provided.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Since their emergence in the late 1990s, credit default swap (CDS) markets have grown
exponentially, to an estimated outstanding notional value of 17.1 trillion dollars in 2005.1
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This phenomenal growth is due to the fact that CDS provide an essential tool for hedging
credit risk in financial markets. CDS are financial instruments that provide insurance against
a credit event destroying value in an entity’s (usually a corporation’s) debt. The insurer of
the credit event is paid a premium (usually quarterly) over a fixed time period to provide the
insurance. And, the insured gets reimbursed for any losses in the value of the entity’s debt, if a
credit event occurs over the contract’s life. Various different types of CDS trade, differentiated
with respect to: (i) the maturity of the contract, (ii) whether the reimbursement procedure
requires physical delivery of the debt issue or not, and (iii) the definition of a credit event.
This paper concentrates on the last provision. In the definition of a credit event, the crucial
distinction is between default and financial restructuring. Default occurs when the borrower
violates the debt contract’s covenants (e.g. a failure to pay required interest or principal on
time), and financial restructuring occurs when the financial liabilities of the borrowing entity
are changed. Default clearly destroys the value of an entity’s debt. But, a financial restructuring
could also destroy existing debt value, even if the entity does not default. For example, the
restructuring could change the debt contract’s subordination, reducing its priority in the event
of default. An open question is the importance of this “restructuring event” in the market
pricing of CDS. This paper provides both an empirical and theoretical investigation of this
issue.
First, we present an empirical investigation of the restructuring credit risk premium for the
US corporate bond market during 1999–2005. Comparing default swap contracts that include
restructuring and those that do not, we find that the average premium for restructuring risk
represents 6%–8% of the swap rate without restructuring. This is an economically significant risk
premium. Everything else constant, we find restructuring premia to be highest in the Telephone,
Service & Leisure and Railroad sectors, and lowest in the Oil and Gas industry and for Gas
utilities. And, when default swap rates without a restructuring clause increase, the increase
in the restructuring premium is higher for high-yield CDS and lower for investment-grade
firms.
Next, we fit a regression model to identify the determinants of CDS rates after controlling for
the restructuring clause, the time to maturity of the contract, and changing International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA) regulations. Key explanatory variables include the distance
to default (a proxy for default risk), the level and slope of the risk-free forward rate curve, a stock-
market volatility index, Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield, and the spread betweenMoody’s Aaa
yield and the 20-year Treasury yield. The model fits the data well, with an R2 of almost 60% for
a linear model, and over 71% when using a logarithmic model.
Last, we provide a reduced-form arbitrage-free model for CDS pricing that explicitly takes
into account the restructuring clause. We incorporate both default and restructuring as separate
events, where restructuring (if it occurs and default has not) causes a jump in the default
intensity. The jump size can be positive or negative, and possibly random. A negative jump is
interpreted as a successful restructuring, while a positive jump is interpreted as an unsuccessful
restructuring. Our model formulation extends the primary–secondary framework of Jarrow
and Yu [27], where a primary firm’s default causes a jump in a secondary firm’s default
intensity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of the
CDS restructuring rules. Section 3 describes the CDS data used in this study. Section 4 provides
a panel data regression to estimate a model for restructuring risk premia. Section 5 develops a
reduced-form model for pricing CDS under different restructuring clauses, and it applies this
model as a case study for Ford Motor Company. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
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Table 1
Restructuring maturity limitations on deliverable obligations in the case of physical settlement
Restructuring clause Deliverable obligations
FR Any bond with maturity of up to 30 years.
MR T ≤ T¯ < (T + 30 months)
MMR Allows an additional 30 months for the restructured bond.
For other obligations, same as MR.
T and T¯ denote the maturity of the CDS contract and the maturity of the deliverable obligations, respectively.
2. Credit default swap restructuring rules
To keep this paper self-contained, we provide a brief description of the restructuring rules
embedded in credit default swaps. As mentioned in the introduction, a CDS provides insurance
against the default of a reference entity’s debt. In our data, the reference entity is a firm. The
insurance is for a fixed maturity. The buyer of protection pays periodic (usually quarterly) premia.
If the credit event occurs, the insurer compensates the buyer for the loss in the debt’s value. This
compensation can be through physical delivery or cash delivery. For physical delivery, the face
value of the security is exchanged for the debt contract itself. For cash delivery, the difference
between the par value of the bond and the post-default market value is paid in cash. Physical
delivery is the more common contract, and the one we concentrate on below. The premium,
called the at-market CDS rate, is measured as a fraction of the face value of debt. The premium
is that quantity that sets the market value of the CDS contract equal to zero at initiation.
According to the ISDA definitions, a contractually defined credit event includes:
bankruptcy, failure to pay, repudiation/moratorium, obligation acceleration, obligation default
and restructuring. By the 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions, a restructuring credit event
occurs if there is: (i) a reduction in the interest rate or in the amount of principal, (ii) a
postponement or other deferral of dates for the payment of interest, principal, or premium, (iii) a
change in the ranking in priority of payment of any obligation that causes subordination of it to
other obligations, and (iv) any change in the currency or composition of any payment of interest
or principal.
ISDA provides four choices for contracting with respect to restructuring:
1. full restructuring (FR), based on the ISDA 1999 Definition,
2. modified restructuring (MR), based on the ISDA 2001 Supplement Definition,
3. modified–modified restructuring (MMR), based on the ISDA 2003 Definition,
4. no restructuring (XR).
With respect to physical delivery, each restructuring rule has different restrictions regarding
the maturities of the deliverable obligations, as summarized in Table 1. As seen, FR allows
delivery of any bond with maturity of up to 30 years. MR restricts the bond to have a maturity
within 30 months of the CDS contract’s maturity, while MMR is similar to MR, except that it
allows an additional 30 months for only the restructured bond. More details on the contractual
terms regarding restructuring can be found in [22,31]. Our paper investigates the impact of the
FR, MR, MMR and XR rules on the market pricing of CDS.
3. Data
Our at-market CDS rate quotes are obtained from the ValuSpread Credit Data provided by
Lombard Risk Systems, from July 1999 to June 2005. For a given date and reference firm,
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the database reports a composite at-market CDS rate. This composite rate is derived from the
mid-market quotes contributed by up to 25 investment banks and default swap brokers. Besides
quotes, the database includes for each date and named firm, the seniority (senior or subordinated)
and the currency of the underlying debt, the maturity of the CDS contract (1, 3, 5, 7, or 10
years), the standard deviation of the mid-market quotes, and the restructuring clause applied
in the contract. Also reported is the average, across sources, recovery rate used by the quote
providers. Interestingly, the frequency of observations has increased over time. The database
contains only month-end quotes between 1999 and 2001, biweekly information from January
2002 to June 2002, weekly data from July 2002 to May 2003, and daily quotes starting May 15,
2003.
The standard deviation of the mid-market rates can be interpreted as a reliability measure of
the associated composite CDS quotes. Indeed, a large reported standard deviation indicates a
wide intra-day dispersion across the contributed CDS quotes, whereas a small standard deviation
might indicate that only one or two sources contributed to the composite quote. In an effort to
limit our exposure to outliers and small-sample bias, we therefore filtered out observations with
standard deviations of less than 1% or greater than 20%.
Industry information for each reference name was obtained from the Fixed Investment
Securities Database (FISD). Among the 2781 tickers listed in ValuSpread, we were able to
identify the industry information and CUSIP numbers for 1521 tickers, of which 929 are US
names, 532 are non-US names, and 60 are CDS indices such as TRAC-X and iBoxx. The number
of identified tickers in each industry, both for US and non-US tickers, are available from the
authors upon request.2
Table 2 reports the number of CDS quotes by restructuring clause. We partition the time
periods by changes to the ISDA definitions. Table 7 in Appendix D provides the number of
quotes per industry for US firms. As seen in Table 2, the majority of US market transactions are
according to MR. Contrary to the European credit market, MMR is the least popular in the US.
Table 3 compares the use of restructuring clauses across investment and non-investment grade
debt. Restructuring is excluded as a covered credit event more for high-yield CDS contracts than
for investment-grade entities. In particular, 36.2% of the quotes for speculative-grade firms are
under the XR rule, whereas for investment-grade firms, XR applies to only 24.1% of the quotes.
Also notice that investment-grade firms comprise 83.4% of the quotes provided.
For analysis, we focus on CDS contracts for senior, US dollar-denominated debt. Let
c·R∆ denote the annualized ∆-year CDS rate under restructuring rule ·R, where ·R ∈
{XR,MR,MMR,FR}.3 The restructuring premium RP of ·R over some base rule BR is defined
as
RP·R,BR∆ = c·R∆ − cBR∆ .
The relative restructuring premium RRP is defined as
RRP·R,BR∆ =
c·R∆ − cBR∆
cBR∆
.
Descriptive statistics for three pairs of restructuring rules are summarized in Table 8 in
Appendix D. Using 5-year CDS rates, we find that the average premium for restructuring risk
2 Note that the number of reference names is about 2100 which is less than the number of tickers. This is because tickers
may change over time even though the company name does not change, for example due to mergers and acquisitions.
3 CDS rates are quoted in basis points.
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Table 2
Number of quotes by restructuring clause and period for US firms whose industry information was verified using FISD
data
Period Restructuring clause Number of quotes
1999 - April 2001 FR 8,562
May 2001 - January 2003 XR 5,767
MR 41,498
FR 47,232
February 2003 - present XR 112,520
MMR 2,436
MR 435,027
FR 64,251
The periods are divided based on the publication months of the 2001 ISDA supplements and the 2003 ISDA definitions.
Table 3
Number of 5-year CDS rate quotes for US firms by rating status
Restructuring clause Total
FR MM MR XR
IG 42,228 733 152,212 61,869 257,042
13.7 0.2 49.4 20.1 83.4
16.4 0.3 59.2 24.1
87.9 98.0 85.0 76.9
SG 5,818 15 26,921 18,581 51,335
1.9 0.0 8.7 6.0 16.7
11.3 0.0 52.4 36.2
12.1 2.0 15.0 23.1
Total 48,046 748 179,133 80,450 308,377
15.6 0.2 58.1 26.1 100.0
For both investment-grade (IG) and speculative-grade (SG) firms, and for each restructuring clause, we report the number
of quotes, the percentage of total number of quotes, the row percentage, and the column percentage.
represents 6%–8% of the swap rate without restructuring. This documents that restructuring
premia are a significant component of CDS rates. Relative to XR, the average and median premia
are positive for all three restructuring clauses (results reported for FR and MR only) and all time
horizons. We also find that FR has positive mean and median spreads over both MR and MMR
(results reported for MR only). The variations in restructuring premia are quite large, however,
considering the magnitude of the average quotes. This suggests that the median restructuring
premia are the more reliable summary statistics.
Although the average and median restructuring premia of FR, MR and MMR over XR are all
positive, negative premia are occasionally observed for all three restructuring rules. In theory,
the existence of negative premia is possible if investors believe that a restructuring credit event
will cause a default event afterwards, and if recovery rates are higher under restructuring than
under default. Nevertheless, conversations with market participants lead us to believe that these
occurrences are more likely due to the differences between quotes by default swap brokers and
investment banks. To be conservative, we remove negative restructuring premia observations
from our sample.
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Table 4
Results of OLS regression of the modified restructuring premium, cMR5 − cXR5 , on the CDS rate under no restructuring,
cXR5 , and on credit-quality and sector fixed effects
Estimate Std. dev. Estimate Std. dev. Estimate Std. dev.
Intercept 0.537 0.045 0.748 0.059 0.683 0.069
cXR5 0.051 0.000 0.050 0.001 0.049 0.001
SG −2.010 0.162 −2.093 0.164
SG × cXR5 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.001
Media & Comm 0.397 0.132
Oil & Gas −0.167 0.142
Railroad 0.678 0.424
Retail . −0.040 0.113
Service & Leisure 0.641 0.115
Transportation 0.197 0.190
Telephone 0.668 0.198
Electric 0.099 0.146
Gas −0.210 0.265
R2 0.518 0.521 0.522
No obs 25,814 25,814 25,814
The reference firm has IG status and belongs to the manufacturing sector. Results for full restructuring risk premia are
available upon request.
4. A regression model for restructuring premia
This section provides a simple and robust regression model for CDS risk premia, including
the restructuring clause as an explanatory variable. The analysis uses 10,020 paired 5-year cXR5
and cMR5 observations from May 2002 through December 2004, taking into account all US firms
that belong to either the Industrial or the Utility sectors as listed in Table 7 in Appendix D. The
estimations are summarized in Table 4.
We run three regressions, controlling for different explanatory variables. In the first regression,
the restructuring premium increases on average by 5.1 basis points for each 100 basis points
increase in the CDS rate without restructuring. The associated coefficient of determination is
51.8%. The estimate of the intercept is 0.537 basis points, meaning that the price of protection
against restructuring risk is almost zero for high-credit-quality firms. The fact that the intercept
is statistically different from zero (12 times its standard deviation) could be due to the omission
of liquidity effects, or to a mis-specification of the linear model. The scatter plot of cMR5 − cXR5
over cXR5 (not shown) also reveals substantial heteroscedasticity, which casts additional doubt on
the linear model specification.4
Our second and third regressions control for investment-grade (IG) or speculative-grade (SG)
status, and for changes in restructuring premia across industries, respectively. The estimation
results are listed in columns three through six of Table 4. Both the differences in the level and
slope effect for speculative-grade firms are significant at the 1% level. When default swap rates
without a restructuring clause increase, the increase in the restructuring premium is higher for
high-yield CDS and lower for investment-grade firms. Holding the value of a CDS contract
without restructuring constant, sectoral differences in the modified restructuring premia are
4 We also experimented with a linear log–log specification that reduced the heteroscedasticity, but the coefficient of
determination was lowered to 0.437.
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relative small, about 1 basis point. They are highest in the Telephone, Service & Leisure and
Railroad sectors, and lowest in the Oil and Gas industry and for Gas utility firms.
In our next set of regressions, we want to control for the relevant economic characteristics
of the firm underlying the CDS contract. To decide on which variables to include, we need
to better understand the economic theory for financial restructurings. The restructuring event
in CDS contracts can be considered as a soft version of private workouts. “Soft” because it is
restricted to debt restructuring prior to any violation of the contract. Should the firm violate
contractual terms, the event would be classified as a default. Consequently, the literature on the
choice between private workouts and legal bankruptcy proceedings provides us with variables
that might be effective in capturing the relative likelihood of out-of-court debt restructuring
(see, [28,6,8]). For our analysis, we focus on the market and balance-sheet variables considered
in the later two articles. In addition, we include the 5-year constant-maturity Treasury rate as
well as Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate bond yield. These two variables are intended to control
for the state of the economy and of credit markets, respectively. (Descriptive statistics for the
firm-specific and macroeconomic variables used are available upon request.)
In financial distress, if a firm is still economically viable, then it is optimal to restructure its
debt and continue operations. Although the debt restructuring could be processed under Chapter
11 bankruptcy laws, Chatterjee et al. [6] show that economically viable firms prefer private
workouts. To capture the economic viability of a firm, we use the ratio of operating income
to total liabilities, as well as the average stock return over the past twenty business days.
Private workouts require voluntary coordination among debtors and creditors. If coordination
problems are severe, bankruptcy would be the only alternative. It is reasonable to believe that
coordination costs are higher the larger the firm’s size and the more complex its debt structure.
We proxy the size of the firm using total assets, total sales, and total liabilities. A preliminary
analysis shows, however, that these variables are highly correlated, causing a multi-collinearity
problem. Consequently, we only use the logarithm of total sales in the subsequent regressions.
We also consider the ratio of subordinated debt to total liabilities, and the ratio of secured debt
to total liabilities, to measure the complexity of the debt structure of the firm.
Additionally, information asymmetry between debtors and creditors may cause coordination
costs to increase. We include the logarithm of the number of employees to proxy for labor
coordination costs. As in [8], in order to capture information asymmetry, we include a dummy
variable for the auditor’s opinion with respect to the level of information disclosure.5 It is 1 if the
auditor’s opinion is an “unqualified opinion” (highest disclosure) and 0 otherwise. Chen [8] also
uses stock return volatility, a variable that is not considered here because of its high correlation
with the likelihood of default, as predicted by the Merton [30] model. We have verified that the
sample correlation between the stock return volatility and the base CDS rate is around 50%, and
that the volatility coefficient is statistically insignificant when included in our regression analysis.
Next, the “cheapest-to-deliver” option inherent in the different restructuring rules could be
an important determinant of CDS rates. The higher the value of the option to the protection
buyer, the higher the restructuring premia. Because the cheapest debt is often the debt with the
longest maturity (and the lowest coupon rate), we include the ratio of debt maturing in more than
five years to long-term debt as a proxy for the cheapest-to-deliver option value. This variable is
5 Compustat annual data provides the auditor’s opinion information for non-banks which consists of six categories:
unaudited, adverse opinion, qualified opinion, no opinion, unqualified opinion with explanatory language, and unqualified
opinion. The “unqualified opinion” represents the highest level of accounting transparency. See the Compustat User’s
Guide for more details.
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Table 5
Results of OLS regression of the modified restructuring premium, cMR5 − cXR5 , on the CDS rate under no restructuring,
cXR5 , as well as credit-quality, firm-specific accounting data, and macroeconomic variables
Estimate Std. dev. Estimate Std. dev. Estimate Std. dev.
Intercept −4.980 0.791 −10.495 1.113 −9.005 1.118
cXR5 0.046 0.001 0.045 0.001 0.045 0.001
SG −1.779 0.162 −4.062 0.227 −4.391 0.225
SG × cXR5 0.009 0.001 0.019 0.001 0.019 0.001
Gov5yr −1.865 0.119 −2.274 0.155 −2.281 0.155
Baa 1.899 0.135 2.399 0.175 2.383 0.175
EBITDA/TtlDebt 6.783 1.439 7.778 1.354
StockRet20days 128.519 11.677 124.144 11.763
log (sales) 0.428 0.065 0.390 0.066
log (no employees) −0.311 0.056 −0.335 0.057
SubDebt/TtlDebt 11.338 1.191 12.822 1.228
SecDebt/TtlDebt 3.340 0.640 4.011 0.649
Auditor’s Opinion 0.354 0.104 0.259 0.106
Intangible/TtlAssets 2.542 0.287
Collateral/TtlAssets −1.079 0.221
Deliverables 0.198 0.037 0.165 0.037
R2 0.527 0.546 0.546
No obs 25,814 14,539 14,495
Results for the full restructuring risk premia are available upon request.
denoted as “Deliverables”. Recall that under the modified restructuring clause, the deliverable
obligations should mature between 5 and 7.5 years after initiation of a 5-year CDS contract.
Table 5 shows the result of the regressions of the modified restructuring premia on
contemporaneous non-restructuring credit spreads, after replacing the sectoral dummy variables
in Table 4 by the firm-specific and macroeconomic parameters discussed above. In summary, we
find that even though the coefficients of the covariates are statistically significant, they have only
limited power in explaining restructuring premia above the CDS rate itself. The R2 increases
from 51.8% when regressing on the base CDS rate only to 54.6% when including all covariates.
Next, using a panel data regression setting, we examine the impact of the restructuring clause
and other potential determinants on CDS rates. Recent empirical work on the determinants of
CDS rates include [1,3,21,4,5], and on the determinants of corporate bond yield spreads or
changes therein include [14,11,20,34], among others.
In our analysis, firm-specific and macroeconomic covariates include: the 1-year distance to
default (DD), Merton’s default probability (MDP), leverage (Lev), the level and slope of the risk-
free term structure (Level, Slope), a stock-market volatility index (VIX), Moody’s Baa corporate
yield (Baa), and the spread between Moody’s Aaa yield and the 20-year Treasury yield (Spread).
A detailed description of these covariates is given in Appendix A.
As an extension to the existing literature, we further take into account the following dummy
variables:
1. Restructuring Rule Dummy (·R).We include dummy variables for the restructuring clauses
XR, MR and FR.
2. Period Dummy (ISDAyr). These dummy variables are used to capture possible structural
shifts due to changes in the ISDA credit definitions. In particular, we consider the 2001 ISDA
supplements issued in April 2001, and the January 2003 ISDA definitions introducing MMR.
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Due to some time lag in the market’s adjustment to these changes, we set ISDA99 to be 1 if
the date is before June 30, 2001, and 0 otherwise; ISDA01 is 1 if the date is between July 1,
2001 and May 31, 2003, and 0 otherwise; and ISDA03 equals 1 if the date is after June 1,
2003, and 0 otherwise.
3. Industry Dummy (INDj). The default intensity and recovery rate are also affected by the
industry-specific environment. Following [7], we categorize the industry as other industries
(IND1), manufacturing and oil and gas (IND2), transportation, media and communications,
and utility (IND3), and finance (IND4).
4. Maturity Dummy (Tyr). The CDS rate depends on the time to maturity. The 1-year distance
to default may not be sufficient to capture the whole shape of the term structure of credit
spreads. Maturity dummies are also included to capture different levels of illiquidity premia
for CDS with different maturities.
Table 9 in Appendix D shows the regression results including both the distance to default and
the restructuring clause dummies, yielding an R2 of 54.5%. The R2 increases to 59.8% after
accounting for the macroeconomic variables, the maturity and sectoral effects. Similar tables
where we substitute the DD measure with leverage or Merton default probabilities are available
from the authors upon request.
Table 10 shows similar results, but with a higher R2, when using the logarithm of the CDS
rate as the dependent variable. Here we achieve a R2 of 71.1% when using distance to default,
and 41.3% and 42.9% for leverage and the Merton default probabilities, respectively.6 We also
experimented with using the CDS rate divided by the reported loss given default, or the logarithm
thereof, as the dependent variable. The regression results did not change noticeably, due to the
fact that the reported recovery rates move little across our sample period.
Finally, Table 11 in the appendix reports the results from regressing the loss given default on
the distance to default in order to gain intuition about the relationship between recovery estimates
and expected default frequencies. We find that the DD measure and the restructuring clause
dummies explain up to 33.2% of the variation in loss given default as reported in the ValuSpread
data. The coefficients for the first three powers of distance to default are significant and they
indicate a positive relationship between default probabilities and loss given default as reported
by Lombard Risk Systems.
Throughout the regression analysis, we use as a benchmark 5-year CDS rates under no
restructuring in the ISDA03 period for firms belonging to the finance industry. The proxies for
default probability used in the tables are the 1-year distance to default, Merton’s 1-year default
probability, and leverage. The regressions using T -year distance to default and T -year Merton’s
default probability, where T is the corresponding CDS maturity, are not reported here but are
available upon request. Although not all estimates are significant, both the signs and magnitudes
of the coefficients of the restructuring rule dummies and the maturity dummies all coincide with
our expectations. In each time period between changes to ISDA regulations, CDS rates are, on
average, highest under full restructuring and lowest under no restructuring.
5. A reduced-form pricing model with different restructuring clauses
In this section, we develop a reduced-form arbitrage-free model for pricing default swaps that
explicitly includes restructuring clauses. To keep the notation simple, we will distinguish between
6 Our analysis suggests that Merton default probabilities predict CDS rates better in a linear fashion, with a resulting
R2 of 46.9%. This is not surprising, since they themselves are approximately exponential functions of the DD measure.
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two categories of credit events, restructuring and default, where default includes bankruptcy and
a material failure by the obligor to make debt payments.
5.1. The basic model
We suppose that the restructuring of a given firm occurs at the first event time τ R of a
(non-explosive) counting process N R , relative to a probability space with measure P (called
the physical measure) and an increasing family {Ft }t≥0 of information sets that satisfy the usual
conditions (see, for example, [32]). Assuming arbitrage-free and frictionless markets, Harrison
and Kreps [23] and Delbaen and Schachermayer [13] show under mild technical conditions that
there exists a risk-neutral measure P˜ (called an equivalent martingale measure) under which the
time-t price Pt of a security paying a random amount Z at a stopping time τ > t is
Pt = E˜t
(
e−
∫ τ
t rs ds Z
)
,
where E˜t is expectation under P˜ conditional on Ft , and r is the risk-free spot rate process.7 We
do not require markets to be complete, so the martingale measure P˜ need not be unique. We
suppose, however, that the measure is determined uniquely by the market being in equilibrium.
We assume that the counting process N R has a risk-neutral restructuring intensity process λR
under P˜ for which the doubly stochastic property applies. The doubly stochastic, or Cox-process,
assumption implies that the risk-neutral probability sR(t, T ) that the obligor will not restructure
on or before time T , given no restructuring by time t, is
sR(t, T ) = P˜
(
τ R > T |Ft
)
= E˜t
(
e−
∫ T
t λ
R
s ds
)
.
Similarly, we assume that a default occurs at the first time τ D of a (non-explosive) counting
process N D , with a risk-neutral default intensity process hD . We extend the doubly stochastic
arrival of credit events under the risk-neutral measure to include hD . As a first approximation,
we let
hDt = λDt + k1 1{t≥τ R} + k2 λDt 1{t≥τ R}, (1)
where k1 and k2 > −1 are random variables, and λD is a non-negative process that can be
interpreted as the risk-neutral pre-restructuring default intensity.
The model specification in (1) allows for both upward and downward jumps in the risk-
neutral default intensity, capturing the possibility for both unsuccessful and successful debt
restructurings. This formulation extends the primary–secondary framework of Jarrow and
Yu [27], where a primary firm’s default causes the secondary firm’s default intensity to jump.
The primary–secondary structure violates the standard Cox-process framework in [29]. However,
as discussed in [10], the no-jump condition in [19] is still satisfied. This enables us to utilize
the standard pricing machinery, because the usual relation between the conditional survival
probability and the default intensity still holds. That is,
sD(t, T ) = P˜(τ D > T |Ft ) = E˜t
(
e−
∫ T
t h
D
s ds
)
, (2)
7 r is progressively measurable with
∫ t
0 |rs | ds < ∞P˜-almost surely, and E˜(e−
∫ t
0 rs ds ) < ∞ for all t . (See [32] for
details.)
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where sD(t, T ) denotes the conditional risk-neutral survival probability with regard to default
events.
The overall conditional risk-neutral probability of survival until time T , given that a credit
event (including both restructuring and default) did not occur by time t , is given by
s(t, T ) = P˜(τ > T |Ft ) = E˜t
(
e−
∫ T
t λ
D
s +λRs ds
)
,
where τ = τ D ∧ τ R , min {τ D, τ R}. In our doubly stochastic setting, conditional on the paths
of the intensities, the probability that both restructuring and default events happen at the same
time is zero.
Eq. (2) can be rewritten as
sD(t, T ) = P˜(τ > T |Ft )+ P˜(τ D > T, τ R ≤ T |Ft )
= E˜t
(
e−
∫ T
t λ
D
s +λRs ds
)
+ E˜t
(
e−
∫ T
t λ
D
s ds
∫ T
t
e
−
(
k1(T−v)+k2
∫ T
v λ
D
s ds
)
λRv e
− ∫ vt λRs ds dv
)
= E˜t
e−
∫ T
t λ
D
s ds
(
e−
∫ T
t λ
R
s ds +
∫ T
t
e
−
(
k1(T−v)+k2
∫ T
v λ
D
s ds
)
λRv e
− ∫ vt λRs ds dv
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RF
 ,
(3)
where the restructuring factor RF can be interpreted as an adjustment factor due to restructuring
risk. It equals 1 if a restructuring event has no direct impact on the default intensity, i.e., when
k1 = k2 = 0. If the jump size is positive (k1 + k2λD > 0), the restructuring adjustment factor
RF falls between 0 and 1, implying a decrease in the risk-neutral survival probability sD(t, T ).
In case the jump size is negative, RF will exceed 1 and lead to an increase in sD(t, T ).
For a default swap contract with maturity T , we assume that the risk-neutral expected
fractional loss of notional in the event of a time-t restructuring equals L Rt = (1 − δR) p(t, T ),
where δR ∈ (0, 1) and p(t, T ) is the time-t price of a risk-free zero-coupon bond with maturity
T . And, in default, it is given by LDt = (1 − δD) p(t, T ), where δD ∈ (0, 1). This is known as
the “Recovery of Treasury” assumption (see, for example, [25]). Our motivation for choosing the
recovery of Treasury assumption over recovery of market value or recovery of face value stems
from the fact that it better describes corporate bond data, see [2].
5.2. Pricing CDS
We now derive the pricing formula for default swaps under the different restructuring clauses.
The derivation is an extension of the existing literature such as [16,24,26]. For simplicity, we
assume a continuous payment structure for default swaps where the protection seller receives a
fixed payment flow of c dollars per unit time until maturity T , or until a credit event occurs.
Let cRR denote the continuous at-market CDS rate when restructuring is included, and cXR if
it is not. The instantaneous risk-free rate r is assumed to be independent of the default times τ D
and τ R under P˜.8 Also, for computational simplicity, we assume that
8 This assumption can be relaxed, as in [26]. Duffie [16] shows, however, that the CDS rate is not much affected by
this dependency.
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λRt = m λDt ,
where m is a positive constant. Similarly, the recovery ratio for a restructuring versus a default
event is denoted by n = δR/δD .
In the event of restructuring or default before maturity of a CDS with restructuring, the risk-
neutral fractional loss of notional is given by (1− δ)p(τ, T )1{τ≤T }, where
δ 1{τ≤T } = δD 1{τ D≤T, τ D<τ R} + δR 1{τ R≤T, τ R<τ D}. (4)
The default swap rate is given in Proposition 1. Proofs of the propositions can be found in
Appendix B.
Proposition 1. If restructuring is a credit event, then the time-t at-market rate for a default swap
with maturity T is given by
cRRt,T =
p (t, T )
(
1− 1+mn1+m δD
) (
1− E˜t
[
e−
∫ T
t (1+m)λDs ds
])
∫ T
t p (t, v) E˜t
[
e−
∫ v
t (1+m)λDs ds
]
dv
. (5)
If restructuring is not a credit event, then the default swap rate can be computed as in
Proposition 2. Notice that the CDS rate without restructuring depends on the likelihood of
restructuring unless both k1 and k2 are equal to zero.
Proposition 2. If restructuring is not a credit event, then the time-t at-market rate for a default
swap with maturity T is given by
cXRt,T =
p (t, T )
(
1− δD) (1− E˜t [1{τ D>T }])∫ T
t p (t, v) E˜t
[
1{τ D>v}
]
dv
, (6)
where E˜t
[
1{τ D>v}
]
, t < v ≤ T , is given in (3).
5.3. Simulation study
This section investigates how the (relative) restructuring premium is affected by the
parameters m, n, and k1 = k. To facilitate intuition, we set k2 = 0 and assume that the
restructuring intensity, pre-restructuring default intensity and k, for k > −λD , are constants.
Extensions to the stochastic setting are straightforward, and can be easily implemented using
Monte Carlo simulations. A preliminary analysis confirmed, however, that the main conclusions
will be similar to the ones drawn from this simpler scenario.
From (5), we have
cRRt,T =
p (t, T )
(
1− 1+mn1+m δD
) (
1− e−(1+m)λD(T−t)
)
∫ T
t p (t, v) e
−(1+m)λD(v−t) dv
. (7)
cXRt,T is given by (6). Using (3), we have
E˜t
[
1{τ D>v}
]
=

1
k − mλD
(
ke−(1+m)λD(v−t) − mλDe−
(
λD+k)(v−t)) ; if λD 6= k
m
(1+ k(v − t)) e−
(
λD+k)(v−t); if λD = k
m
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for all t < v ≤ T . Note that for a constant risk-free rate r , both cRRt,T and cXRt,T are available in
closed form.
As mentioned previously, the Lombard Risk Systems ValuSpread database reports the
recovery rate as a fraction of notional value for each restructuring clause. In addition, Varma
and Cantor [33] report average recovery rates as a fraction of notional by initial credit event.
We use this information to calibrate δD and δR . For simplicity, we set τ D ≈ (T + t0)/2 and
τ R ≈ (T + t0)/2 if the credit event occurs after the time of initiation t0 of the CDS contract
but before its maturity date T . Let δ¯R and δ¯D denote the reported recovery rates as a fraction of
notional for restructuring events and non-restructuring default events, respectively. Then
δD ≈ 1−
(
1− δ¯D
) p (t0, (T + t0)/2)
p (t0, T )
(8)
and
δR ≈ 1−
(
1− δ¯R
) p (t0, (T + t0)/2)
p (t0, T )
. (9)
The ValuSpread database shows that from May 2001 to December 2004, the median δ¯D
is 0.40 and the median cXR5 is 49.88 basis points (bps). From this we calibrate λ
D to be
cXR5 /(1 − δ¯D) = 83.13 bps (which assumes k = 0). The risk-free interest rate r is set equal
to 1.63%, the average 3-month Treasury rate during the same period. The estimate of m can be
obtained from Moody’s annual and monthly surveys of global corporate defaults and recovery
rates, see Table 12 in Appendix D. Since most of our CDS observations are from 2003 and 2004,
we set m = 0.173, the relative frequency of restructurings with respect to other credit events
during that time. From [33] we obtain a rough estimate of n = 1.51.
5.3.1. The jump parameter
Fig. 1 shows the effect of k, the expected change in the default intensity at restructuring, on the
relative restructuring premium. Note that the CDS rate with restructuring and time to maturity∆,
cRR∆ , is not affected by k (see (7)). The relative restructuring premium decreases as k increases.
The median RRP, based on our data, is 6.3%, which corresponds to a k of roughly 0.13
according to Fig. 1. This implies that investors expect that a restructuring event will be
unsuccessful. Also note that the restructuring premium can possibly be negative for high levels
of k. In our example, it becomes negative when k exceeds 0.56.
5.3.2. The default intensity
Fig. 2 shows that the restructuring premium increases as the default intensity increases, almost
linearly, regardless of the sign of k. The relationship between the relative restructuring premium
and the default intensity can be either positive or negative depending on k. For k equal to−0.004
the plot shows a negative relationship, but as k increases above zero, the sign becomes positive.
This sign change in the slope provides a testable hypothesis as to when the market expects the
restructuring event to be successful.
5.3.3. The restructuring intensity and recovery rate
Next, we investigate how (relative) restructuring premia are affected by the ratio of
restructuring to default intensities, m, and the ratio of recovery rates, n. If the restructuring
is expected to be successful (k < 0), there exists a positive relationship between both the
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Fig. 1. Relative restructuring premium with respect to k, the expected change in default intensity at a restructuring event.
Other parameters are fixed at λD = 83.13 bps, δ¯D = 0.40, m = 0.173, n = 1.51,∆ = 5, and r = 1.63%.
Fig. 2. Restructuring premium and relative restructuring premium with respect to the pre-restructuring default intensity
λD for various k. Other parameters are fixed at δ¯D = 0.40, m = 0.173, n = 1.51,∆ = 5, and r = 1.63%.
restructuring premium and m and the relative restructuring premium and m, for all levels of
n. This is because as m increases, the likelihood of a restructuring event increases. This implies
that the overall likelihood of default, and thereby cXR∆ , decreases since a restructuring event will
lower hD . On the other hand, cRR∆ always increases with m.
If the restructuring is expected to be unsuccessful (k > 0), then the marginal impact of m
on cXR∆ is positive. The relationship between m and the restructuring premium will generally be
positive, but the effect of m on cRR∆ becomes less for higher ratios of recovery rates, n. As n
increases, the restructuring loss rate increases relative to the default loss rate, and the marginal
impact of m on the (relative) restructuring premium may eventually turn negative.
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Fig. 3. Relative restructuring premium with respect to m and n for k = −0.003. Other parameters are fixed at
λD = 83.13 bps, δ¯D = 0.40,∆ = 5, and r = 1.63%.
Fig. 4. Relative restructuring premium with respect to m and n for k = 0.2. Other parameters are fixed at λD = 83.13
bps, δ¯D = 0.40,∆ = 5, and r = 1.63%.
Note that n and the (relative) restructuring premium are always negatively related, since n has
no effect on cXR∆ , while its marginal impact on c
RR
∆ is negative. These results are illustrated in
Figs. 3 and 4.
5.3.4. The time to maturity
Fig. 5 shows how the relative restructuring premium changes with the time to maturity of the
CDS contract. If we ignore the effect of restructuring events on default risk by setting k equal to
0, then cXR∆ is overestimated when the true value of k is negative. The opposite is true for positive
k. Since this effect is amplified for longer maturities ∆, the difference in CDS rates computed
using different values for k increases as time to maturity increases. A similar observation holds
for the relationship between the relative restructuring premium and ∆, as a function of k.
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Fig. 5. Relative restructuring premium with respect to time to maturity ∆ for various k. Other parameters are fixed at
λD = 83.13 bps, δ¯D = 0.40, m = 0.173, and r = 1.63%.
5.4. Model specification
This section provides a time-series model for pricing CDS with and without restructuring risk.
The risk-neutral restructuring intensity and the risk-neutral pre-restructuring default intensity are
modeled as functions of a state variable X t which follows a square-root process
dX t = (a − bX t ) dt + σ
√
X t dWt , X0 > 0, (10)
where Wt is a standard Brownian motion with respect to the physical measure P, and a, b and
σ > 0 are constants. We assume that the boundary non-attainment condition 2a > σ 2 holds to
ensure that X t stays positive P-almost surely. Under the risk-neutral measure P˜, we have
dX t =
(
a˜ − b˜X t
)
dt + σ√X t dW˜t , (11)
where W˜t is a standard Brownian motion under P˜. The market-price-of-default-risk process Λt
is given by dWt = −Λt dt + dW˜t , where
Λt = a − a˜
σ
√
X t
− b − b˜
σ
√
X t . (12)
For classical affine term-structure models, a−a˜ is restricted to be zero (see, for example, [12]).
However, Cheridito et al. [9] show the existence of the equivalent martingale measure P˜ under the
more general specification (12), as long as the boundary non-attainment condition 2a˜ > σ 2 holds
also under P˜. We assume that this condition is satisfied. A desirable feature of this “essentially”
affine specification proposed by Duffee [15] is that Λt does not approach zero, even if the
volatility of X t approaches zero. Also, Λt can switch signs over time.9
9 The correct sign of Λt can be determined from the expected return on defaultable bonds, as in [35]. In our model,
given risk-averse investors, Λt is negative.
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We assume that the risk-neutral restructuring and pre-restructuring default intensities are given
by
λRt =
m
1+ m X t and λ
D
t =
1
1+ m X t .
From (4), (8), and (9) it follows that the risk-neutral expected fractional loss of notional for CDS
with restructuring at time t is given by (1− δRR) p(t, T ), where
δRR = δ
D + mδR
1+ m
≈ 1−
(
1− δ¯
D + mδ¯R
1+ m
)
p (t0, (T + t0)/2)
p (t0, T )
, 1− (1− δ¯RR) p (t0, (T + t0)/2)
p (t0, T )
. (13)
As before, t0 and T are the time of initiation and the maturity of the CDS contract, respectively.
δ¯RR can be interpreted as the recovery rate as a fraction of notional for the CDS with restructuring
as anticipated at the time t0, assuming that τ ≈ (T + t0)/2. Similarly, δR = nδD implies
δ¯R = nδ¯D + (1− n)(1− 1/x), where x = p(t0, (T + t0)/2)/p(t0, T ). From (13), we have
m = δ
RR − δD
δR − δRR
= δ¯
RR − δ¯D
δ¯R − δ¯RR . (14)
Estimates of δ¯RR and δ¯D are available, on a firm-by-firm basis, from Lombard’s ValuSpread
database. Given a value for n, (14) then allows us to obtain benchmark values for m for each
firm. Appendix C shows that closed-form approximations for pricing CDS are available for our
model specification.
5.5. Ford motor: A case study
This section estimates the credit risk parameters in form of a case study. To estimate the
parameters driving the term structure of credit spreads, we first need to obtain the time series
of the risk-free term structure. Zero-coupon bond prices are stripped from the constant-maturity
Treasury rate curve by assuming a piecewise linear forward rate curve.
We follow a two-step procedure to estimate the intensity parameters. In a first step, we
estimate the parameters for the state variable process X t introduced in (10) and (11) from
observed CDS rates with restructuring. We assume that 5-year CDS rates are priced without
errors so that we can invert the pre-restructuring default intensity λDt from the CDS rate at t ,
given (firm-specific) estimates for m, n, and δ¯D .
The 1-year and 10-year CDS rates are assumed to be measured with the noise processes u1t
and u10t , respectively. The measurement error is defined as
uht ≡ cRRt,t+h − c¯RRt,t+h,
for h = 1, 10. Here, cRRt,t+h is the observed annualized h-year at-market CDS rate with
restructuring, and c¯RRt,t+h denotes its “true” counterpart. {uht }t are assumed to be independently
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Table 6
Parameter estimates for Ford Motor in nominal terms
σ a b a˜ b˜ σ 1 σ 10
Estimate 0.0090 0.0003 0.0062 0.0022 −0.0057 0.0164 0.0019
Std. Dev. 0.0003 0.0003 0.0050 0.0004 0.0048 – –
and normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ h , for h = 1, 10. This leaves
us with the parameter vector Θ = {a, b, σ, a˜, b˜, σ 1, σ 10} to be estimated in this first step. We
employ maximum-likelihood estimation to obtain an estimate Θˆ .
Given estimates for m, n, δ¯D and Θ , the CDS rate without restructuring is a function of
the jump parameter k only. In the second stage of our estimation procedure, k can therefore be
determined in the sense of the best least-squares fit.
We conclude this section by investigating Ford Motor Company. The maximum-likelihood
estimate Θˆ , based on observed default swap rates with modified restructuring, are reported in
Table 6. Here, we set m = 0.173 and n = 1.51 as discussed in Section 5.3. While the median
relative restructuring premium for Ford Motor during our sample period is 0.77%, observed
RRP values are quite volatile. We believe this can be attributed, at least in part, to substantial
measurement errors. To calibrate k, we therefore use the assumption that relative restructuring
premia are constant at 0.77%. By replacing CDS rates without restructuring accordingly, we find
kˆ to be 1.56. These results, although obtained in a simplified setting, indicate that investors that
bought default protection for Ford Motor in recent years expected default to become more likely,
risk-neutrally, once a restructuring event occurred.
6. Conclusion
This paper presents both an empirical and theoretical investigation of restructuring risk in
credit default swap markets. Estimates for the price of restructuring risk in the US corporate
bond market during 1999–2005 are obtained by comparing quotes for default swap contracts
with restructuring as a covered credit event and without. Here, we find that the average premium
for restructuring risk represents 6%–8% of the CDS rate without restructuring. This is a
significant percentage of the swap rate spread. We also show that when default swap rates without
restructuring increase, the increase in restructuring premia is higher for low-credit-quality firms
than for high-credit-quality firms. Next, we fit a regression model to identify the determinants of
CDS rates. Key explanatory variables include the distance to default (a proxy for default risk),
the level and slope of the risk-free forward rate curve, a stock-market volatility index, Moody’s
Baa corporate bond yield, and the spread between Moody’s Aaa yield and the 20-year Treasury
yield. The model fits the data well, with an R2 of almost 60% for a linear model, and over 71%
when using a logarithmic model.
On the theory side, we provide a reduced-form arbitrage-free model for CDS pricing
that explicitly takes into account the restructuring clause. We incorporate both default and
restructuring as separate events, where restructuring (if it occurs and default has not) causes a
jump in the default intensity. The jump size can be positive or negative, and possibly random. A
negative jump is interpreted as a successful restructuring, while a positive jump is an unsuccessful
restructuring. We simulate the model using calibrated data and provide a case study of Ford
Motor to illustrate the feasibility of estimating and implementing the model.
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Appendix A. Control variables
1. Distance to Default (DD). This measure is based on [30] and is, roughly, the number of
standard deviations of asset growth by which a firm’s market value of assets exceeds a
liability measure. It is the primary firm-specific variable in our regression models. A detailed
description of the construction of distances to default with respect to the physical measure can
be found in Appendix A of [18]. The results in [4] indicate that the distance to default measure
is a significant determinant of CDS rates. Note that here we use the risk-neutral distance to
default by replacing the mean rate of asset growth with the risk-free rate.
2. Merton Default Probability (MDP). The annualized T -year risk-neutral Merton default
probability is defined as
p˜iM (T ) = 1− Φ (DDT )1/T ,
where DDT is the T -year risk-neutral distance to default andΦ denotes the normal cumulative
distribution function.
3. Leverage (Lev) As in [11], leverage is defined as the ratio of book value of total debt divided
by the sum of market value of equity plus book value of total debt.
4. Level and slope of risk-free term structure (level, slope).We use the 2-year Treasury yield
for the level, and the difference between 10-year and 2-year Treasury yields for the slope
variable. Daily data of constant-maturity Treasury rates are available from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis.
5. VIX index (VIX). The VIX Index measures the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options.
Daily data can be downloaded from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Website.
6. Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield (Baa). This variable captures the state of the corporate
bond market, which is closely related to the CDSmarket. The time series of Moody’s seasoned
Baa (and Aaa) corporate bond yields is available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
7. Market spread (spread). Spread is defined as the difference between the Moody’s seasoned
Aaa corporate bond yields and the 20-year Treasury yields. It is used to capture the illiquidity
of the corporate bond market, given that Aaa-rated corporate bonds are almost free of default
risk.
8. Firm size (size). As in [18], firm size is measured as the logarithm of the firm’s total assets
(Compustat item 44).
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. To keep notation simple, we assume that a T -year CDS with
restructuring is initiated at time 0. The market value of the payments by the buyer of protection
at time 0 is given by
cRRT E˜
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ v
0 rs ds1{τ>v} dv
]
= cRRT
∫ T
0
p (0, v) E˜
[
1{τ>v}
]
dv
= cRRT
∫ T
0
p (0, v) E˜
[
e−
∫ v
0 (1+m)λDs ds
]
dv.
Recall that in Section 5.2 we assume risk-neutral independence between the risk-free rate r and
the default time τ . The market value of the potential payment by the seller of protection is
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Table 7
Number of quotes by industry for US names with industry information verified using the FISD database
FISD industry code Total Number of observations
XR FR MR MMR
Industrial
10 Manufacturing 258,355 40,648 46,008 170,240 1,459
11 Media/Communications 48,693 12,192 7,682 28,819 0
12 Oil & Gas 38,429 5,972 6,269 26,188 0
13 Railroad 1,961 395 247 1,319 0
14 Retail 58,842 10,551 10,855 37,424 12
15 Service/Leisure 21,358 12,184 7,855 1,319 0
16 Transportation 20,301 3,613 3,950 12,738 0
32 Telephone 14,738 3,457 1,474 9,807 0
Finance
20 Banking 30,990 3,391 7,528 20,071 0
21 Credit/Financing 28,256 5,130 6,193 16,933 0
22 Financial services 38,567 4,323 6,283 27,961 0
23 Insurance 41,358 5,957 4,474 30,927 0
24 Real estate 26,256 2,397 4,478 18,416 965
25 Savings & Loan 137 0 0 137 0
26 Leasing 1,629 273 108 1,248 0
Utility
30 Electric 39,685 6,019 4,731 28,935 0
31 Gas 7,148 1,356 1,069 4,723 0
33 Water 0 0 0 0 0
Government
40 Foreign agencies 0 0 0 0 0
41 Foreign 0 0 0 0 0
42 Supranational 835 0 593 242 0
43 US treasuries 0 0 0 0 0
44 US agencies 2,151 429 248 1,474 0
45 Taxable municipal 0 0 0 0 0
Miscellaneous
60 Miscellaneous 0 0 0 0 0
99 Unassigned 0 0 0 0 0
Total 679,689 118,287 120,045 438,921 2,436
E˜
[
e−
∫ τ
0 rs ds (1− δ) p (τ, T ) 1{τ≤T }
]
= p (0, T ) E˜ [(1− δ) 1{τ≤T }]
= p (0, T )
{(
1− δD
)
E˜
[
1{τ D≤T,τ D≤τ R}
]
+
(
1− δR
)
E˜
[
1{τ R≤T,τ R≤τ D}
]}
.
The risk-neutral probability of a default event occurring prior to both maturity and
restructuring can be calculated as
E˜
[
1{τ D≤T,τ D<τ R}
]
=
∫ T
0
E˜
[
E˜
(
1{τ=τ D}|τ = v
)
1{τ=v}
]
dv
= E˜
[∫ T
0
λDv
λDv + λRv
(
λDv + λRv
)
e−
∫ v
0
(
λDs +λRs
)
ds dv
]
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Table 8
Summary statistics for (relative) restructuring premia
Restructuring premium of FR over XR
Variable N Mean Std. dev. P99 Q3 Med Q1 P1
RP1Y 9,819 5.89 63.27 102.50 8.50 2.56 −1.03 −54.35
RP3Y 17,046 5.72 93.00 83.54 7.67 3.13 0.49 −25.10
RP5Y 19,719 6.89 64.99 70.31 7.75 3.86 1.70 −19.25
RP7Y 16,538 7.65 39.70 58.15 8.67 4.54 1.86 −14.50
RP10Y 13,534 8.18 58.84 63.18 10.57 5.34 1.75 −18.63
RRP1Y 9,819 10.03 28.07 120.92 19.26 8.22 −3.57 −43.06
RRP3Y 17,046 9.20 16.64 51.11 15.03 8.31 1.51 −18.26
RRP5Y 19,719 8.43 8.81 32.54 12.21 7.95 4.02 −11.37
RRP7Y 16,538 8.85 9.77 41.03 12.74 7.93 3.73 −12.07
RRP10Y 13,534 8.69 12.30 52.56 13.05 7.56 2.86 −17.11
Restructuring premium of MR over XR
RP1Y 27,209 1.72 46.45 74.35 4.50 1.19 −2.54 −62.00
RP3Y 52,460 3.16 31.67 55.26 5.13 2.20 0.30 −45.18
RP5Y 56,952 3.78 33.86 47.50 5.06 2.66 1.12 −34.68
RP7Y 46,978 3.97 34.02 42.15 4.75 2.38 0.67 −20.97
RP10Y 45,558 4.12 33.76 46.30 5.93 2.66 0.37 −31.85
RRP1Y 27,209 4.34 23.92 89.77 12.40 4.01 −6.81 −47.02
RRP3Y 52,460 5.90 11.64 44.16 10.47 5.70 0.78 −23.30
RRP5Y 56,952 5.69 8.91 37.78 7.91 5.19 2.42 −16.21
RRP7Y 46,978 4.86 9.76 37.39 6.93 4.07 1.26 −14.96
RRP10Y 45,558 4.68 10.99 47.90 7.07 3.93 0.55 −18.55
Restructuring premium of FR over MR
RP1Y 15,322 3.86 70.34 105.70 6.53 1.30 −2.28 −78.34
RP3Y 24,752 3.37 47.80 72.06 4.27 0.97 −1.45 −46.52
RP5Y 27,355 3.95 54.49 55.90 3.51 1.14 −0.45 −25.99
RP7Y 22,944 4.42 53.72 57.28 5.40 2.07 −0.21 −24.26
RP10Y 18,784 3.61 58.31 50.92 6.80 2.26 −1.30 −34.73
RRP1Y 15,322 9.64 44.29 139.98 17.71 4.12 −7.67 −47.44
RRP3Y 24,752 4.36 20.13 62.65 9.21 2.59 −3.75 −25.60
RRP5Y 27,355 3.72 14.30 49.97 6.26 2.35 −0.92 −19.52
RRP7Y 22,944 4.95 13.86 58.01 8.04 3.67 −0.36 −20.70
RRP10Y 18,784 4.48 15.63 59.75 8.58 3.30 −1.86 −26.61
= 1
1+ m
(
1− E˜
[
e−
∫ T
0 (1+m)λDs ds
])
.
Similarly, the risk-neutral probability of restructuring occurring prior to both maturity and default
is
E˜
[
1{τ R≤T,τ R<τ D}
]
= E˜
[∫ T
0
λRv
λDv + λRv
(
λDv + λRv
)
e−
∫ v
0
(
λDs +λRs
)
ds dv
]
= m
1+ m
(
1− E˜
[
e−
∫ T
0 (1+m)λDs ds
])
.
The initial at-market CDS rate is that choice for cRRT at which the market values of the
payments by the buyer and seller of protection are equal. 
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Table 9
Regression results for CDS rates
Estimate Std. dev. Estimate Std. dev. Estimate Std. dev. Estimate Std. dev.
Intercept 1049.376 5.909 1045.541 6.180 934.285 6.718 1282.206 27.764
MR 8.631 2.378
FR 17.903 2.378
XR01 −1.627 4.396 3.528 4.243 −70.194 6.354
MR01 15.815 4.396 20.971 4.243 −52.752 6.354
FR01 33.931 4.396 39.086 4.243 −34.636 6.354
MR03 6.569 2.640 6.569 2.543 6.569 2.483
FR03 13.772 2.640 13.772 2.543 13.772 2.483
IND1 122.343 3.719 81.347 4.171
IND2 115.944 3.518 82.545 3.873
IND3 173.073 3.996 140.239 4.205
T1 −18.771 3.247 −18.404 3.173
T3 0.347 2.718 −0.738 2.655
T7 10.552 2.701 12.828 2.641
T10 11.904 2.870 11.488 2.805
DD −445.985 3.189 −444.991 3.200 −443.209 3.116 −446.207 3.062
DD2 60.703 0.546 60.688 0.545 59.530 0.533 59.052 0.522
DD3 −2.553 0.028 −2.555 0.028 −2.471 0.027 −2.433 0.027
Size −18.908 1.002
Level 1.118 0.065
Slope 0.710 0.119
Baa −0.999 0.063
Spread 3.148 0.119
No obs 25,266 25,266 25,266 25,266
R2 0.545 0.545 0.578 0.598
adj. R2 0.545 0.545 0.578 0.597
The proof of Proposition 2 is similar to that of Proposition 1, and therefore omitted.
Appendix C. Closed-form approximations of CDS rates
In this appendix, we provide closed-form approximations of the default swap rates derived
in (5) and (6), using the model specification in Section 5.4.
To calculate the CDS rates derived in (5) and (6), we need to compute expectations of the
form
E1 = E˜
[
e−
∫ T
0 (1+m)λDs ds
]
and
E2 = E˜t
[
e−
∫ T
t λ
D
s ds
∫ T
t
e
−
(
k1(T−v)+k2
∫ T
v λ
D
s ds
)
λRv e
− ∫ vt λRs ds dv] .
The first term E1 is of the form
E1 = eα1(0,T )+β1(0,T )λD0 ,
where α1 (0, T ) and β1 (0, T ) are available in closed form (see, for example, [17]).
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Table 10
Regression results for logarithm of CDS rates
Leverage Merton Default Prob Distance to Default
Estimate Std. dev. Estimate Std. dev. Estimate Std. dev.
Intercept 3.9864 0.1184 3.5491 0.1163 9.8921 0.0894
XR01 −0.0571 0.0291 −0.0840 0.0287 −0.2535 0.0205
MR01 0.0336 0.0291 0.0067 0.0287 −0.1628 0.0205
FR01 0.1111 0.0291 0.0842 0.0287 −0.0854 0.0205
MR03 0.0790 0.0114 0.0790 0.0112 0.0790 0.0080
FR03 0.1585 0.0114 0.1585 0.0112 0.1585 0.0080
IND1 0.5811 0.0191 0.3934 0.0188 0.4059 0.0134
IND2 0.3125 0.0178 0.0376 0.0174 0.3061 0.0125
IND3 0.6429 0.0192 0.3813 0.0190 0.5467 0.0135
T1 −0.2817 0.0145 −0.2376 0.0143 −0.3293 0.0102
T3 −0.0743 0.0122 −0.0521 0.0120 −0.0917 0.0086
T7 0.0556 0.0121 0.0424 0.0119 0.0931 0.0085
T10 0.1518 0.0128 0.1175 0.0127 0.1736 0.0090
Lev 2.2968 0.0232
MDP 0.0011 0.0000
DD −1.0496 0.0099
DD2 0.1009 0.0017
DD3 −0.0035 0.0001
Size −0.1848 0.0048 −0.0405 0.0045 −0.1295 0.0032
Level −0.0013 0.0003 0.0015 0.0003 0.0094 0.0002
Slope −0.0011 0.0005 −0.0003 0.0005 0.0047 0.0004
Baa 0.0008 0.0003 −0.0004 0.0003 −0.0088 0.0002
Spread 0.0110 0.0005 0.0123 0.0005 0.0200 0.0004
No obs 25,266 25,266 25,266
R2 0.413 0.429 0.711
adj R2 0.412 0.429 0.710
To approximate the second expectation E2 for constants k1 and k2, we assume that credit
events occur only at discrete time intervals ∆, 2∆, . . . , T = n∆. We have
E2 = E˜t
[
e−
∫ T
t λ
D
s dse
−
(
k1(T−τ R)+k2
∫ T
τ R λ
D
s ds
)
1{τ R≤T }
]
=
n∑
j=1
E˜
[
e−
∫ T
t λ
D
s dse
−
(
k1(T−τ R)+k2
∫ T
τ R λ
D
s ds
)
1{( j−1)∆<τ R≤ j∆}
]
≈
n∑
j=1
E˜
[
e−
∫ T
t λ
D
s dse
−
(
k1(T− j∆)+k2
∫ T
j∆ λ
D
s ds
)
1{( j−1)∆<τ R≤ j∆}
]
.
Using iterative conditioning, the last term can be written as
E2 =
n∑
j=1
E˜
[
e−
∫ j∆
t λ
D
s ds e−k1(T− j∆)
×
(
e−
∫ ( j−1)∆
0 λ
R
s ds − e−
∫ j∆
0 λ
R
s ds
)
E˜ j∆
(
e−(1+k2)
∫ T
j∆ λ
D
s ds
)]
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Table 11
Regression results for loss given default as a fraction of notional
Estimate Std. dev. Estimate Std. dev. Estimate Std. dev. Estimate Std. dev.
Intercept 67.450 0.110 68.082 0.113 66.740 0.125 74.630 0.505
MR −0.534 0.044
FR 2.939 0.045
XR01 −0.402 0.080 −0.336 0.079 1.004 0.116
MR01 −2.640 0.079 −2.566 0.078 −1.224 0.116
FR01 2.338 0.079 2.415 0.078 3.764 0.116
MR03 −0.130 0.048 −0.123 0.047 −0.146 0.045
FR03 2.988 0.049 3.003 0.048 3.023 0.046
IND1 1.234 0.069 0.942 0.075
IND2 1.166 0.065 0.946 0.070
IND3 2.046 0.074 1.721 0.076
T1 0.259 0.060 0.160 0.057
T3 0.124 0.051 0.080 0.048
T7 0.170 0.051 0.103 0.048
T10 0.172 0.054 0.169 0.051
DD −3.890 0.059 −4.026 0.058 −3.984 0.058 −3.991 0.055
DD2 0.591 0.010 0.593 0.010 0.579 0.010 0.558 0.009
DD3 −0.026 0.001 −0.026 0.001 −0.025 0.001 −0.024 0.000
Size −0.112 0.018
Level 0.025 0.001
Slope 0.067 0.002
Baa −0.047 0.001
Spread . 0.069 0.002
No obs 23,910 23,910 23,910 23,910
R2 0.332 0.361 0.381 0.441
adj R2 0.332 0.360 0.381 0.441
Table 12
This table shows the number of initial credit events of Moody’s rated US bonds from 2000 to 2004
Year Failure to pay Bankruptcy Distressed exchange Total m
2000 83 40 2 125 0.016
2001 91 44 7 142 0.052
2002 55 22 11 88 0.143
2003 28 22 8 58 0.160
2004 17 8 5 30 0.200
2000–2004 274 136 33 443 0.080
2003–2004 45 30 13 88 0.173
It is constructed from the Moody’s annual and monthly surveys of global corporate defaults and recovery rates from 2000
to 2004. m is calculated as the number of restructurings (here, distressed exchanges) divided by the total number of other
credit events.
=
n∑
j=1
e−k1(T− j∆) E˜
[
e−
∫ ( j−1)∆
t
(
λDs +λRs
)
ds
(
1− e−
∫ j∆
( j−1)∆ λRs ds
)
eα
j
2+β j2 λDj∆
]
=
n∑
j=1
e−k1(T− j∆) E˜
[
e−
∫ ( j−1)∆
t
(
λDs +λRs
)
ds E˜( j−1)∆
{
eα
j
2+β j2 λDj∆
}]
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−
n∑
j=1
e−k1(T− j∆) E˜
[
e−
∫ ( j−1)∆
t
(
λDs +λRs
)
ds E˜( j−1)∆
{
e−
∫ j∆
( j−1)∆ mλDs ds eα
j
2+β j2 λDj∆
}]
=
n∑
j=1
e−k1(T− j∆) E˜
[
e−
∫ ( j−1)∆
t (1+m)λDs ds
(
eα
j
3+β j3 λD( j−1)∆ − eα j4+β j4 λD( j−1)∆
)]
,
where α j2 = α j2 ( j∆, T ) and β j2 = β j2 ( j∆, T ), α j3 = α j3 (( j − 1)∆, j∆) and β j3 =
β
j
3 (( j − 1)∆, j∆), and α j4 = α j4 (( j − 1)∆, j∆) and β j4 = β j4 (( j − 1)∆, j∆) are available
in closed form, for all j .
Finally, E2 can be approximated by
E2 =
n∑
j=1
e−k1(T− j∆)
(
eα
j
5+β j5 λD0 − eα j6+β j6 λD0
)
,
where α j5 = α j5 (0, ( j − 1)∆), β j5 = β j5 (0, ( j − 1)∆), α j6 = α j6 (0, ( j − 1)∆), and β j6 =
β
j
6 (0, ( j − 1)∆) are also available in closed form. (Again, see [17]) for details.)
Appendix D. Additional tables and background statistics
See Tables 7–12
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